Since the 1980s there have not been significant changes in union density in Belgium, making the country one of the exceptions to the 'de-unionisation' trend in the European Union (European Commission 2009: 20-22) .
1 Belgium's relatively high and stable union density is considered an 'anomalous case' in comparative perspective (Shalev 2007: 272-273) . Explanations are diverse and it is difficult to determine the relations between the explanatory factors, not to mention their relative weight. But the fact that trade unions provide a wide range of services to their members has certainly helped to underpin the social custom of union membership, the payment of unemployment benefits being, perhaps, the most high-profile union service.
2 Similar to Denmark, Finland and Sweden -countries with voluntary unemployment insurance (Clasen and Viebrock 2008) -the (perceived) risk of unemployment drives workers into unions in Belgium, notwithstanding the fact that unemployment insurance is mandatory. Another idiosyncrasy of the Belgian unemployment insurance system is that unemployment benefits are, in principle, unlimited in duration.
3 However, this last feature has gradually been hollowed out since the 1980s and is repeatedly being called into question by international organisations, the OECD in particular (see Faniel 2008 Faniel : 54, 2007 . Today, the unemployment insurance system is again under pressure due to the economic crisis and the associated rise in temporary unemployment. In fact, as a buffer to the economic downturn, temporary unemployment has not only increased rapidly but its scope has recently been extended. This article seeks to provide a provisional assessment of the short-term effects of temporary unemployment for the Belgian trade unions. It also reflects briefly on possible political threats to the current unemployment insurance system in general.
Debate on temporary unemployment arrangements
The global financial turmoil and economic crisis hit Belgium in the second half Under the temporary unemployment scheme, blue-collar workers are entitled to unemployment benefit for a certain period of time, during which the employment contract is not terminated but partly or wholly suspended on a temporary basis. In other words, the scheme enables bluecollar workers to keep their jobs and employers to save costs (for application procedures and vocational training) in anticipation of when the economy picks up. Temporary unemployment for economic reasons does not apply to whitecollar workers because trade unions fear that this would hollow-out their employment protection -employment law still draws a distinction between blue-collar and white-collar workers in Belgium. Therefore, although originally aimed at reconciling family life and work, employers have, since the crisis hit, increasingly been 'encouraging' white-collar workers to agree to a 'career break' by means of the 'time credit system' and collective working time reductions. In October 2008, as an alternative to lay-offs and their associated costs (including a loss of knowhow), employers' organisations, especially in industry, launched a proposal for temporary unemployment for specific types of white-collar workers (at least for 2009).
The unions, worried about the rising costs to the social security system, were reluctant, linking the possible measure to the long-discussed issue of harmonising the employment status of blue-collar and white-collar workers and instead favoured collective working time reductions (Van Gyes 2009). Nevertheless, acknowledging the current difficulties, the main employers' organisations and trade union confederations were able to conclude an intersectoral agreement, setting a maximum net wage increase of €250 for 2009-2010.
Of particular importance here is that the social partners also agreed on an increase of compensation for income lost by bluecollar workers when they are subject to temporary unemployment and the extension of this scheme to agency workers and workers with fixed-term employment contracts. In December 2008, the government under Prime Minister Yves Leterme (referred to as 'Leterme I') (proactively) integrated the agreement (and the policies taken by the regional governments) in its stimulus package to counter the economic crisis. 5 Further negotiations between the social partners on temporary unemployment for white-collar workers failed, however.
Nevertheless, in April 2009, the government of Prime Minister Herman Van Rompuy ('Van Rompuy I') introduced additional measures for reducing working time and minimising lay-offs. 6 The measures are temporary (until 31 December 2009) but could be extended, once, until 30 June 2010, depending on the economic situation. One measure, pushed particularly by the liberal parties, in many respects resembles the temporary unemployment scheme for blue-collar workers. Under the newly introduced arrangements for white-collar workers, the employment contract is partially or fully suspended, for a maximum duration of 26 or 16 weeks, respectively. The arrangement should be included in a collective agreement concluded at the sectoral or firm level or in a company plan. White-collar workers are granted unemployment benefit equal to 70% or 75% of their salary, up to a given ceiling, and a possible additional payment from the employer. Although it is too early clearly to see the consequences for trade unions of the new temporary unemployment arrangement for white-collar workers, an analysis of previous difficult economic times and escalating unemployment can probably shed some light on this.
Different economic times, different inflows
Voluntary and state-subsidised trade union-run unemployment funds existed in Belgium before World War II. The so-called 'Ghent system' -named after the Belgian town in which union-linked funds first flourished -shifted towards a mandatory unemployment insurance system after the War. However, by paying out unemployment benefits the unions retained an intermediary role within the system (de Deken 2007: 15-25) . From the distribution of unemployment benefit expenditure, it is obvious that it is the unions' role in distributing unemployment benefit that has allowed them to maintain a dominant position (Januarius 2008; Vandaele 2006: 649-651) . Although receiving unemployment benefit is not dependent on union membership, more than 85% of the jobless are trade union members, while a special state agency pays out benefits to the rest of the unemployed. Besides the historical identification of the trade unions with the payment of unemployment benefit, the unions' supremacy could largely be explained by the dense network of payment offices, the unions' ability to pay benefit slightly earlier than the state agency and perceptions of better service (information, advice and legal assistance) from the unions (see Faniel 2008 Faniel : 53-54, 2007 . 1980; 1985-90; 1996-97; 1999-2001; 2006-2007 Of particular importance here is the distinction between periods of rise and of decline in the employment level. In times of falling unemployment, the dwindling share of the HVW/CAPAC within the payment of unemployment benefits is less pronounced, while the unemployed are even more likely to turn to the payment offices run by the unions during years of rising unemployment. Although the prior union status of the jobless is not known, one can assume that a significant percentage of them join a union only when they become unemployed. The different growth rates of payment offices in times of economic prosperity and of crisis thus provide indirect evidence of the assertion that workers in 'Ghent countries' are more inclined to join a union (or to remain a union member) in times of economic downturn. At the same time, one should add that the unions' relationship with the jobless is rather uneasy, since unions are naturally more oriented to those in employment (Faniel 2009 (Faniel , 2006 .
Different intensity, different inflows
The disaggregated data in Table 2 (below) show a different growth rate of payment offices related to intensity of unemployment increase. In years of steep -and sudden -rises in unemployment, the payment offices run by unions grew by only 0.13% compared to a growth rate of 0.20% when unemployment increases are more modest. But only the ACV/CSC experienced a decline in its share (standing at 41% in 2007). Although in terms of membership the ACV/CSC is the largest confederation in Belgium, and particularly dominant in Flanders, the socialist ABVV/FGTB slightly enlarged its share, from 37.3% in 1977 to 40.8% in 2007. This growth might be explained by the over-representation of the ABVV/FGTB among groups with a higher risk of unemployment and in economic regions which have seen a strong, long-term rise in unemployment (Brussels and Wallonia), or both. 1978-79; 1984; 1991; 1995; 1998; 2004-2005 . Years of strong rise (N=8): 1981-83; 1992-94; 2002-2003 . * A weak (strong) rise in unemployment is considered to be an annual rise lower (higher) than the average annual growth rate in rising unemployment during 1978-2007 (9.5%).
Source: Unemployment level (harmonised): OECD. Stat. Expenditure on unemployment benefits: RVA/ONEM.
Looked at in another way, the fact remains that the decline of the HVW/ CAPAC slows down by half in periods of rapid unemployment growth. One can only hypothesise why this is the case since no research has been conducted on the different growth rates of the paying offices. Even so, one can assume that periods of strong economic decline probably affect all groups of workers, even those who normally do not have a high unemployment risk (such as whitecollar workers and highly qualified workers). Those workers might be more inclined to turn to the state agency in case of unemployment, due to weaker identification with unions. 9 The new temporary unemployment arrangement for white-collar workers might produce similar effects, although it remains to be seen whether the arrangement will be applied more in sectors or companies in which unions are weak.
Conclusion: increased pressure
It is almost certain that the Belgian social security system will face a budget deficit in 2009, due to an expenditure increase (caused mainly by -temporary -unemployment benefits) and, especially, declining revenues. At the time of writing, it is still unclear what kind of austerity measures will be taken by central government in the near future in order to reduce the deficit. But the expected deficit has already provoked overt questioning by 'Lijst Dedecker', a Flemish populist party, with regard to the unions' role in the unemployment insurance system. In fact, the unions' continuing role in the payment of unemployment benefits has never been uncontested, partly as a result of the false assumption that Belgium is the only country in which unions are involved in the administration of the system. 10 On a regular basis, (extreme) right-wing parties and conservative factions -mostly surreptitiously -question the unions' role, deeming the unemployment insurance system 'ambiguous', calling into question its 'transparency' and demanding 'administrative simplification'. Another danger lurking just around the corner for the unions (in Flanders) within the unemployment insurance system may be the further decentralisation of the Belgian state (cf. Faniel 2008: 61-63) . Beneath this manifest, but often 'technical', debate is a latent but dominant tendency within almost all Flemish political parties to reinforce activation policies in a context of growing solidarism (that is, the development of more distinctive social policies in Flanders while excluding French-speaking Belgium). Further activation policies would make unemployment benefits more conditional, which would indirectly affect the trade unions' role in the system. Moreover, today, job search assistance and training and the evaluation of job search efforts are split between the regional and the federal levels, respectively. Bringing the two together again at the regional level by decentralisation would have an impact on the social security system, which still resides at the federal level. One thing is certain: the unions currently have their work cut out with the rise in unemployment. One might expect a further inflow to the unions of jobless when temporary unemployment turns into full unemployment in the coming months (although there are signs of economic recovery), an inflow which will almost certainly be at a faster rate than the state agency, but maybe at a slower rate than in periods of marginal unemployment increases.
Introduction
Flexicurity is a commonly used term, mostly in discussions on labour market efficiency. It is a key principle of EU labour market policies. In general terms, it is a strategy aimed at strengthening both security and flexibility for the two sides on the labour market -namely, employees and employers -and it is defined more precisely in the relevant Commission documents. 1 In research papers on this subject (see, for example, Nekolova 2008) the concept is explained in terms of employment policy practices developed in Denmark, where a high degree of deregulation is combined with a generous social protection system and extensive application of active labour market programmes. In this article, we shall describe the three basic pillars of flexicurity -labour market flexibility, employment protection and income protection in the Czech Republic -in comparison with other EU countries.
Labour market flexibility in the Czech Republic
By international comparison, the Czech Republic has a high level of labour market flexibility. On the OECD flexibility scale, based on the so-called Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) Index, the Czech Republic is among the countries with very low labour market protection levels, essentially at the same level as in Denmark.
